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The dominant feature of the female labor force 
in the United States across the twentieth century 
is its striking and large increase. But continuity 
in the increase may be an illusion. Women’s paid 
employment may have been permanently altered 
by certain events.
The 1940s have been viewed as such a water-
shed decade. Labor force changes from 1940 to 
1945 were huge. Around 14 million men were 
mobilized, the male labor force declined by 
almost 9 million, and the female labor force, 
which stood at 14 million in 1940, increased by 
more than 7 million.
1 Surveys show that various 
norms loosened during the 1940s. But accord-
ing to a revisionist view the changes did not per-
sist. Women were forced off their jobs at war’s 
end, and the war propaganda machine went into 
reverse gear after VJ-Day, extolling the virtues 
of women’s role in the home.
2
Longitudinal data have been used to deter-
mine the veracity of these two opposing views. 
Various surveys, including the originals underly-
ing the Palmer report, enabled a piecing together 
of cohort work histories (Goldin 1991a). Among 
the many findings is that the women who entered 
1 During the war, 11.5 million men 18 to 44 years old 
were drafted or enlisted at their draft board and 3.1 million 
volunteered, but not all were eligible to serve. Male employ-
ment fell by only 3.5 million because the unemployment rate 
was still high in 1940. The decrease for men is from the peak 
in July 1940 to the trough in January 1945; the increase for 
women is from the trough in January 1941 to the peak in 
July 1944. US Bureau of the Census (1947), Tables 4 and 5. 
2 Goldin (1991a) contains a bibliography of the “water-
shed” and “revisionist” literatures. 
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the work force during the World War II years 
accounted for just 20 percent of the married 
women 27 to 51 years old who were employed 
in 1951. From this evidence WWII did not look 
like a great watershed in the employment of 
women. Yet, WWII could still have had an effect 
to 1950, and its longer-run impact could have 
been greater still. But the longitudinal data used 
ended in 1951.
The war’s impact on female labor force partic-
ipation to 1945 does not appear to have resulted 
from increases in real, after-tax wages. Pretax 
real wages did rise, but after-tax wages actu-
ally fell because of the large tax hikes.
3 Because 
female employment during the war soared, a 
usual explanation that relies on an increased 
opportunity cost of time would not seem to be 
correct.
Standard models of changing household bud-
get sets may not be fully applicable to the early 
1940s because of the end of employment restric-
tions in the form of “marriage bars” (Goldin 
1991b) and because unemployment in 1940 was 
15 percent. Employment could have soared even 
though real, after-tax wages were stable. But 
another factor may have operated. Employment 
may have increased substantially for women 
because their labor supply function shifted to 
the right.
That possibility is supported by a recent find-
ing about the impact of the war on women’s 
employment by Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle 
(2004)—henceforth, AAL—in a paper that clev-
erly uses state mobilization rates to identify the 
impact of the war.
4 The mobilization rate is the 
fraction of males between certain ages who were 
3 According to Mulligan (1998, Table 1) real after-tax 
wages for women fell by 4 percent from 1940 to 1944 and 
then rose by 17 percent from 1944 to 1948. 
4 Other researchers have used this identification, includ-
ing Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), who find a long-MAY 2013 258 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
inducted into the military. It varied geographi-
cally for many reasons exogenous to initial lev-
els of female employment and provides a way to 
measure the “treatment effect” of the war. The 
goal of AAL, however, was to assess the impact 
of female labor supply on the wage structure, 
not to estimate the role of the war on women’s 
labor supply.
Our purpose is to identify the short- and long-
run impacts of WWII on women’s labor supply 
by using the mobilization rates for various types 
of men. We term these effects as “shocking” 
labor supply, and we divide the factors affect-
ing labor supply into those that were general 
and those that were specific. We concentrate on 
women who were young during the war years 
(25 to 34 years old in 1950 and 35 to 44 years old 
in 1960) and currently married in 1950 or 1960 
since they would have been more constrained 
by social norms before the war and potentially 
more “treated” by the war.
The general influence of the war would have 
affected all women living through the period. 
The specific influence of the war would have 
been experienced by women whose husbands 
were in the armed services. Their labor supply 
would have shifted to the right due to an income 
effect, since their husbands earned less than in 
their civilian jobs, and also because husbands 
were often an impediment to a wife’s working 
for pay. Women whose husbands were away 
during the war years had twice the employment 
rate in 1944 of those in the same age group 
whose husbands were not away (see Goldin 
1991a, Table 1).
We find that most of the impact was general 
in nature and that the aggregate mobilization 
rate produces the largest and most robust effect 
on weeks worked and labor force participation. 
The impact, moreover, was experienced almost 
entirely by women in the top half of the educa-
tion distribution. We uncover effects for 1950, 
which we term the short-run impact, and for 
1960, a longer-run effect. Women who were 
married but without children during WWII were 
most impacted by the mobilization rate in 1950. 
By 1960 WWII still influenced their labor sup-
ply decisions and also those of women with chil-
dren during WWII.
run effect on women’s labor supply operating through the 
marriage market. 
I.  Identifying the “Shocking” of Female Labor 
Supply by WWII
A. World War II Mobilization Rates
Mobilization in the United States began 
September 16, 1940 with the Selective Training 
and Service Act, which called for the registration 
of all men 21 to 35 years old. Deferments could 
be granted based on dependents, occupation, 
and fitness to serve. Registration was extended 
five additional times. Wives were initially con-
sidered dependents, as were children if born 
before September 15, 1942. The wife deferment 
ended April 12, 1943, and the automatic child 
deferment ended December 11, 1943, although 
mobilization rates for fathers were low, and they 
were generally drafted only after others in the 
local draft board pool were exhausted. Certain 
agriculture and war-industry occupations were 
deferments and some men, deemed IV-F, were 
exempt because of physical and mental dis-
abilities. On April 21, 1944, however, almost all 
deferments were eliminated. 
5
To identify the general and specific treatment 
effects of WWII on women, we have produced 
mobilization rates from US Selective Service 
bulletins for several groups of men by race, age, 
and parental status as of August 1, 1945 (see 
Goldin and Olivetti 2013, Table A.1). We pres-
ent here only the results using the aggregate rate 
for all 18-to-44-year-olds, termed MOB, which 
is almost identical to that used by AAL.
6 The 
total mean is 0.462, and it varies by state from 
0.400 to 0.536.
7
Our estimation relies on the fact that mobi-
lization rates varied by state because of the 
factors that led to deferments (see Acemoglu, 
Autor, and Lyle 2004, Table 4, and Goldin and 
Olivetti 2013, Table A.2). Quotas were set from 
the number of registrants available for service 
(I-A) plus those already serving (I-C). Thus, 
the higher the number of deferments, the lower 
would be the mobilization rate since registrants 
included those with deferments.
5 See also Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle (2004) on WWII 
mobilization and US Selective Service (various years). 
6 The main difference is that they use inductions as of 
January 1946. 
7 Goldin and Olivetti (2013) discuss alternative mobili-
zation rates. Here we make reference to results that use a 
mobilization rate for white men 18 to 37 years old. VOL. 103 NO. 3 259 A ReAssessment of the Role of WoRld WAR II on Women’s lAboR supply
B. Identification Strategy
The idea behind our identification strategy 
is that various groups of (white) women who 
went through the war may have been treated dif-
ferently by the mobilization of men. All were 
affected by the increase in demand for their own 
labor in local labor markets (here US states) and 
by a desire to aid the nation in its war effort. 
Those who were married at the time of increased 
mobilization were affected by the induction of 
their husbands, including the reduction in their 
family income and their increased indepen-
dence. Those who had children would have been 
less impacted by the mobilization of their hus-
bands because the induction rate for fathers was 
far less than for nonfathers, and women with 
children had low labor force participation rates.
We have two main samples of white (nonfarm) 
married women. Those who were 25 to 34 years 
old in 1950 and those 35 to 44 years old in 1960. 
Women in both samples were 16 to 29 years 
old in 1941 to 1945, the years of US involve-
ment in WWII. These women went through the 
war years in one of three demographic circum-
stances: married with children; married without 
children; and unmarried. In each case the con-
trol group includes comparable women in 1940 
similarly situated demographically during a 
“pseudo” WWII period in the 1930s.
 8
We consider two outcomes: weeks worked 
and labor force participation. We use the 1940, 
1950, and 1960 Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS) of the US population census 
(Ruggles et al. 2010). The mobilization rates are 
given by state of birth to ensure greater exogene-
ity. We first investigate if there was a treatment 
effect of WWII over the short run to 1950 and 
then if the treatment had a longer-run or more 
lasting effect on female labor supply to 1960.
The general version of the estimating equa-
tion is
(1)    y
its   =   φs   + γ  dτ   +   αt   Z
it  
  +   βt   dτ   X
s1940   + δ    dτ  MO  Bs   +   ε
its  ,
8 For selection rules, see notes to Table 1. Goldin and 
Olivetti (2013) has further details on the data and empiri-
cal strategy. We use white women because black women’s 
participation was high before the war and many were in agri-
cultural occupations, excluded here. 
where   y  its   is an outcome, either weeks worked 
or labor force participation, for person i in year 
t and having state of birth s.   φ  s   are state of birth 
dummies,  d  τ   is a year dummy for either τ = 1950 
or 1960, and   Z  it   are covariates for woman i such 
as number of children and age dummies.   X  s1940  
are state of birth covariates such as fraction of 
male employment in farm occupations, fraction 
black, and mean level of education of the adult 
population all as of 1940.
  These covariates, 
identified by AAL, are included to account for 
differences in mobilization by state that may 
be correlated with the outcome variables. The 
coefficient of greatest interest is δ, that on the 
interaction of the year dummy and the relevant 
mobilization rate (MO B  s  ) in the individual’s 
state of birth.
When we use the three demographic groups 
(married with children, married without chil-
dren, or single), we add main effects, an inter-
action with the year dummy, and another with 
the mobilization rate and the year dummy. It is 
this triple difference on which we will focus. 
Furthermore, we divide the samples roughly 
in half by those who have graduated from high 
school and those who have not, and we estimate 
the equation for each group separately.
Weeks of work and labor force participation 
rates for our samples do not vary consistently by 
mobilization rates in the state of birth for 1940 
(see Goldin and Olivetti 2013, Table A.3). Thus, 
the use of the mobilization rate is a valid empiri-
cal strategy.
II.  Results and Interpretation
Women who were 25 to 34 in 1950 appear to have 
been impacted by WWII, as can be seen from the 
coefficients on the triple differences in columns 
1 and 2 of Table 1. Married women 35 to 44 
years old in 1960 also experienced a substantial 
increase in both weeks worked and labor force 
participation relative to their demographic coun-
terparts in 1940 (see columns 3 and 4). We have 
not included the estimation for the less-educated 
women in Table 1 since, for both age groups, 
those coefficients have fairly large standard errors 
and are occasionally of the wrong sign (Goldin 
and Olivetti 2013, Tables 3 and 4). But the esti-
mates for the more-educated women are positive, 
large and more precisely estimated for both out-
comes. The finding that the more-educated group 
was impacted, whereas the less-educated group MAY 2013 260 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
was generally not, is a robust result and found in 
virtually all of our estimations.
In interpreting the Table 1 results we will 
compare states with low mobilization rates to 
those with high mobilization rates. We use a 
simple difference metric: the mobilization rate 
of the median state in the “high” group minus 
that of the median state in the “low” group. The 
measure is equivalent to the difference between 
the rate of the eighth highest and the eighth low-
est states by mobilization rate. For the aggregate 
mobilization rate the state difference metric is 
6.8 percentage points.
Consider, first, the results on weeks worked for 
the 25-to-34-year-old women in 1950. For those 
who were married and without children, the effect 
of a change in the mobilization rate of 6.8 per-
centage points is 2.9 weeks (= 43.33 × 0.068), 
or about a 28 percent increase compared with the 
1940 or 1950 mean for the group (around 10 or 
11 weeks).
9 The change for women who were 
9 The means for weeks worked and the labor force par-
ticipation rate are in Goldin and Olivetti (2013), Table 2. 
not married during WWII is 2.6 weeks (= 37.95   
× 0.068) or about an 18 percent increase from the 
1940 mean for the group of 14 weeks.
The coefficient is smaller (and less precisely 
estimated) for women who were married with 
children during the war. These women would 
have had less ability to be impacted directly 
by the increased demand for their labor than 
women in the other groups. In contrast, those 
who were already married during the war but 
had no children would have had the double 
impact of having an increased demand for their 
labor and husbands who were most likely away 
in the armed forces. That interpretation seems to 
be borne out when we use the aggregate mobi-
lization rate, as in Table 1, and also when we 
use the mobilization rate for white men 18 to 37 
years old (see Goldin and Olivetti 2013, Table 
A.4).
We find similar results for the labor force par-
ticipation rate, but with a few differences. For 
women without children, the impact of chang-
ing the mobilization rate by 0.068 is 0.065 
(= 0.96 × 0.068) or about a 30 percent increase 
using either the 1940 or 1950 participation rate 
Table 1—Impact of World War II Mobilization on the Labor Supply of More-Educated White, Married Women
  25–34 years old in 1950   35–44 years old in 1960
  Weeks worked LFPR   Weeks worked LFPR
(1) (2)   (3) (4)
τ × MOB × MarrChildWWII 23.65 0.90*** 42.68** 0.68*
(15.48) (0.3) (17.86) (0.41)
τ × MOB × MarrNoChildWWII 43.33** 0.96*** 31.89*** 0.64**
(17.14) (0.34) (12.06) (0.31)
τ × MOB × UnmarrWWII 37.95* 0.79 7.61 0.1
(19.48) (0.49) (15.11) (0.35)
Constant 18.15*** 0.39*** 13.19*** 0.30***
(0.88) (0.02) (1.01) (0.02)
Observations 20,846 20,846 49,009 49,009
R
2 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.11
Notes: τ = 1950 (columns 1, 2) or 1960 (columns 3, 4). Standard errors are clustered at state of birth and year level. Our sam-
ple includes white, married women with ≥ 12 years of school, in their first marriage, not in institutional group quarters, not 
employed in farming, and born in and residing in the continental United States excluding the District of Columbia and Nevada. 
We use sample line weights. Women with children during WWII are those living with an eldest child at least five years old in 
1950 (15 in 1960). MOB is the mobilization rate for all men 18 to 44 years old in the woman’s state of birth. MarrChildWWII = 
married with children during WWII or the pseudo-WWII period in the 1930s; MarrNoChildWWII = married without children 
during the WWII or pseudo-WWII period; UnmarrWWII = not married during the WWII or pseudo-WWII period. Regressions 
include main effects for the three groups, and their interaction with τ and MOB, 1940 state of birth covariates interacted with 
τ. Individual covariates are state of birth and age dummies, number of children < 5 years and number of children ≥ 5 years.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 **  Significant at the 5 percent level.
  *  Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: 1940, 1950, and 1960 IPUMS of the US decennial population censuses (Ruggles et al. 2010).VOL. 103 NO. 3 261 A ReAssessment of the Role of WoRld WAR II on Women’s lAboR supply
(about 0.22). The impact is a bit smaller for mar-
ried women with children, but participation rates 
for that group are lower so the effect as a frac-
tion of the participation rate is larger. The coef-
ficient for women who were not married during 
WWII is smaller and less significant than for the 
others.
10
Finally, and perhaps most important, are the 
results for women 35 to 44 years old in 1940 
and 1960 (columns 3 and 4). In this case women 
who were married during WWII with or with-
out children show the greatest longer-run impact 
from changes in the mobilization rate.
For the magnitude of the effect, we again 
use the difference metric. For married women 
with children, the coefficient in Table 1 implies 
an increase of 2.9 weeks (= 42.7 × 0.068) or 
about 24 percent of the 1940 and 1960 aver-
age of about 12 weeks. The estimate for mar-
ried women without children is a bit lower and 
results in an increase of 2.2 weeks or 20 percent 
of the 1940 and 1960 average.
Similarly, the coefficient for the labor force 
participation of women with children during 
WWII implies a change of 4.6 percentage points 
(= 0.68 × 0.068) or 17 percent of the 1940 to 
1960 mean of 0.28 for the group. The impact for 
the married women without children is about the 
same.
In summary, the impact of WWII as indi-
cated by the relationship between labor supply 
outcomes and the mobilization rate is found 
for both weeks worked and labor force par-
ticipation. In all cases, it is experienced almost 
entirely by those who were more educated. The 
impact is generally stronger in 1950 for white 
women who did not have children during WWII, 
and it is similarly strong by 1960 for those who 
were married during WWII, with or without 
children. We also find effects of a similar order 
of magnitude for married women 35 to 49 years 
old in 1950 but not for women who were older.
Our findings are robust to assigning mobili-
zation rates by state of residence. Excluding 
Southern states made the short-run results some-
what larger, although those for 1940 to 1960 
were less robust. We do not find that states with 
higher mobilization rates had a very different 
10 However, all three groups show a statistically signifi-
cant response to changes in the mobilization rate of white 
men 18 to 37 years old (see Goldin and Olivetti 2013, Table 
A.4). 
fraction of their female labor forces employed in 
office, retail sales, managerial, and professional 
occupations in 1940 relative to those with low 
mobilization rates.
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III. Concluding Remarks on Shocking Female 
Labor Supply
Did WWII have a “shocking” effect on 
  women’s labor supply as the “watershed theory” 
posits, or did it have no persistent impact as the 
“revisionists” would assert? Our work allows an 
integration of the two views of WWII and wom-
en’s labor supply.
By identifying the impact of WWII using the 
mobilization rate instrument we find that states 
with higher mobilization rates did experience 
an increase in female labor supply measured in 
terms of weeks worked and labor force partici-
pation. The impact is perceptible only among 
the upper half of women by level of schooling. 
In addition, the shorter-run impact of WWII 
was greatest among those who did not have 
children during WWII, whereas the longer-run 
impact was greatest for those with children dur-
ing WWII. In almost all cases the impact of 
mobilization on weeks and participation for the 
higher-educated group was substantial, around 
20 percent of the average level for the period 
considered.
How do these findings bear on the question 
posed? To better interpret our findings we use 
the Palmer survey that retrospectively followed 
women’s work histories from 1940 to 1951. 
Women 25 to 44 years old in 1951 who entered 
the work force from 1940 to 1944 were probably 
“shocked” by the increased demand for female 
labor during WWII. But which of these women 
had a persistent effect of the “shock”?
The Palmer survey allows us to observe the 
occupations of these women and their educa-
tion. Of great importance is that the occupations 
these women had in 1944 greatly depended on 
their level of education. Among those with at 
least a high school diploma, almost 80 percent 
were in white-collar jobs. But for those with 
less than a high school diploma just 25 percent 
were in white-collar positions. About 75 percent 
were in blue-collar jobs, and the vast majority 
11 Goldin and Olivetti (2013) contains further robustness 
checks. MAY 2013 262 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
of these were in manufacturing. By 1950 these 
women’s occupations were not much different 
than in 1944, except that manufacturing posi-
tions decreased and service occupations took 
their place among the lesser-educated group.
Although the survey does not allow us to trace 
women who entered the labor force in 1944 but 
did not continue to 1951, it provides clues to 
why the higher-educated women would have 
had a persistent impact from the “shock.” Lower-
educated women were disproportionately pulled 
into manufacturing positions to 1944, and many 
probably did not remain because women were 
often unwelcome in them. The more-educated 
group, however, entered sectors that enabled 
women to remain to 1950 and beyond.
Our work helps reconcile the watershed and 
revisionist views of WWII. Women’s labor sup-
ply was altered by the war. Women whose labor 
supply was shifted appear to have been those who 
entered white-collar positions from 1940 to 1944. 
For some of them, WWII involved a “shock” to 
their labor supply that had persistent effects.
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